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Biodiversity Offsetting and Conservation Covenants 
 






There are two potential developments in conservation law which are currently very topical: 
biodiversity offsetting and conservation covenants.  In spring 2012 DEFRA started a two-year 
pilot on offsetting in conjunction with a number of local authorities, and a further policy paper is 
expected at the end of this summer, suggesting some enthusiasm for the idea.  Meanwhile, the 
Law Commission’s consultation on proposals for conservation covenants closed in late June 2013.  
Offsetting and covenants are quite separate mechanisms but overlap to some extent since 
covenants may play a significant role as a means of providing offsets if these do become a feature 





The basic idea of biodiversity offsetting is that where development will cause unavoidable harm to 
biodiversity, it may still be allowed to proceed so long as compensatory measures are taken 
elsewhere so as to secure the overall objective of ensuring no net loss to biodiversity (or a higher 
aim of achieving some net gain).  There is an obvious comparison with the offsetting of 
greenhouse gas emissions, but as discussed later, there are significant differences when this 
approach is applied to biodiversity. 
 
 The idea of offsets for nature conservation is not unknown in the current law, here and 
elsewhere.  It is a fundamental feature of the Habitats and Species Directive that if projects 
damaging a Natura Site are allowed to proceed because of imperative reasons of overriding public 
interest, then the state must take compensatory measures to preserve the coherence of the Natura 
network.  Similarly the Environmental Liability Directive calls for “complementary remediation” 
on other sites if the damage caused cannot be remediated on the spot.
2
  There is also experience of 
offsetting overseas, notably in the USA in the form of “wetland mitigation”, where obtaining a 
permit to develop wetlands may depend on providing wetland protection or enhancement nearby.  
In Australia there are various Bio-banking schemes, where developers can buy credits to support 
approved conservation schemes to make up for harm their projects are causing.  For offsets, and 
covenants, such experience abroad is useful, but must be used cautiously since the mechanisms 
operate against a very different background.  Not only is the physical context different in that there 
may be much more land not already developed or subject to intense management and thus 
                                                 
1
 This paper was presented by Prof. Reid to the Nature Conservation Working Group at the UKELA conference and is 
based on a project funded by the AHRC, entitled "The Privatisation of Biodiversity?" 
2
  Note a complication in the terminology.  In the Environmental Liability Directive this is referred to as 
“complementary” remediation, whilst “compensatory” remediation is the term used for interim measures while more 
permanent restoration is being established.  The offsetting mechanism used in the USA is referred to as “mitigation”, a 
term used here for the reduction of the impact in situ.  
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available to be dedicated to conservation in exchange for development sites, but the legal context 
is markedly different, especially in the USA where there is much less direct regulation of privately 
owned land. 
 
 DEFRA started a two-year pilot project on offsetting in spring 2012, based on voluntary 
arrangements linked to the planning system.
3
  After the first year, reports were that no offsets had 
actually been agreed under this project, but DEFRA is pressing on to a further consultation paper.  
In Scotland there seems to be no such drive to develop the idea, although there are passing 
mentions in various policy papers.  The view in England seems to be that offsetting is an idea 
whose time has come, since it helps both economic growth and biodiversity conservation, 
objectives which the government is keen to prioritise.  It is felt that at present opportunities, both 
economic and environmental, are being missed which offsetting could help to realise.   Its 
application would not be in relation to strongly protected sites such as those covered by the 
Habitats and Species Directive, but would help to redress the continual erosion of biodiversity as 
greenfield sites are being developed, sites that are often already degraded as a result of intensive 
agriculture.  An effective offsetting scheme would allow projects to proceed where there is a need 
for this whilst biodiversity would benefit as other sites are enhanced and those with land suitable 
for conservation projects would be able to secure some reward for this use of their land.  In 
meetings and discussions, the consensus from various perspectives has been that offsetting is 
neither inherently good nor bad as a concept - everything depends on how it is operated.  
Consequently there is a desire to move forward the debate about what offsetting could achieve and 
what sort of offsetting system we need to achieve the chosen goals.  
 
 The starting point for offsetting is the hierarchy set out in the planning framework: 
development causing harm to biodiversity should be avoided and steps taken to mitigate any harm 
caused.  Where development is justified but there is still some unavoidable harm, then 
compensatory steps should be taken, on the same site if possible, but if not elsewhere.
4
  The 
objective is to ensure no net loss to biodiversity, as opposed to allowing the continual erosion 
which has marked past decades.  At a time of growing pressure for development, the attraction of 
this mechanism in some quarters is obvious as a means of allowing developments to go ahead on 
sites that might otherwise be “sterilised” by biodiversity concerns. 
 
 For the pilot project DEFRA produced guidance for developers and offset providers that 
sets out how to calculate what is an appropriate offset.  This looks first at the site being damaged, 
specifically the area of land affected, the distinctiveness of the habitat concerned and its existing 
condition, both of the latter elements allocated values on a three-point scale.  The offset being 
provided is also considered, looking first at the same factors of area, distinctiveness and condition, 
but subject to a limitation that there must be no “trading down” to a less distinctive habitat or one 
in poorer condition.  A number of discounting factors are then applied, considering the difficulty 
of restoring or creating the proposed habitat, the length of time before good habitat can be 
provided and how well the site fits with wider biodiversity strategies.  This fairly straightforward 
approach contrasts with the scheme in New South Wales where candidates must complete a four-





                                                 
3
 See https://www.gov.uk/biodiversity-offsetting  
4
 National Planning Policy Framework (2012), para.118. 
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Whilst the potential for this mechanism to improve the recognition of biodiversity is clear, 
applying offsetting to biodiversity, as opposed to things such as emissions, raises a number of 
issues.  The basic problem is one of equivalence, because biodiversity is not a fungible like 
greenhouse gas emissions; creating new wetland sites does nothing for the snakes and lizards 
whose habitat is destroyed if areas of heathland are built on.  Equivalence has a number of aspects.  
Should we allow only “like-for-like” offsets, so that the habitat being provided must be of the 
same sort as that being lost?  This may provide stronger protection for biodiversity but limits the 
flexibility which is an attraction of offsetting.  It may be desirable to use offsetting schemes to 
achieve gains for particularly rare habitat at the cost of something more “run of the mill”, but not 
everyone is happy in comparing the worth of different sorts of habitat.  Effective conservation of 
biodiversity also requires a coherent programme and cannot be achieved in a fragmented way, 
whereas the main concern in relation to greenhouse gases is simply the overall global 
concentration.  There is no point in creating an offset that will support only one stage of a species’ 
life-cycle, and habitat is more valuable when connected with other suitable areas as opposed to 
being located in isolation.  The need for coherence must thus be taken into account in any 
offsetting scheme. 
 
 A further aspect is that habitat restoration or creation is not an instant or guaranteed 
process.  There is growing evidence that steps to create even some of the apparently simpler 
habitats such as salt-marshes do not deliver sites of the same richness as the natural ones that we 
are losing.  It is certainly the case that a much bigger area of newly created or restored habitat is 
needed to achieve equivalent biodiversity value, and it may need a very long time for habitats such 
as woodland to become established.  Moreover any projections of what will happen are rendered 
uncertain by the prospect of climate change.  This temporal dimension raises the question of how 
much credit a developer should get today for measures to establish an offset that may (or may not) 
provide equivalent biodiversity benefits only in several decades’ time 
 
 Judgments on value and equivalence are also affected by the human factor.  Scientific 
assessments have to be viewed alongside the public preference for “cuddly” animals over those 
that are not so “cuddly” but may be endangered - the response to culling proposals would be very 
different if it was snakes and lizards, not badgers that suffer from tuberculosis.  There is also the 
dimension of human engagement.  A small woodland in an urban setting may be scientifically less 
valuable than the same area connected to a larger forest in an area remote from human disturbance, 
but it will have much more value in terms of human interaction of all sorts.  A danger with 
offsetting is that it ends up relocating all biodiversity sites away from the areas of development 
pressure, leaving the population in urban areas even more removed from the natural world. 
 
 A further issue is that of additionality.  Any offset must be providing something more than 
would be provided in any case and developers should not gain any credit unless they are providing 
something genuinely additional.  Judging this can be difficult, especially against what is an ever-
changing background of reforms to the Common Agricultural Policy, rural support and planning 
policies, which alter the priority given to conservation. 
 
 When it comes to thinking about the operation of an offsetting scheme, the practicalities 
for the participants need to be considered, as revealed in the pilot project.  A key issue is timing 
since the reality is that gaining planning permission for a development that requires an offset is just 
part of extended process.  The developers cannot have all the details of the offset in place until 
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they know what is to be required of them
5
 and there are difficulties in finding and making formal 
arrangements with offset providers and over the formulation of planning conditions to provide an 
enforceable guarantee of the offset.  How offsets fit with applications for outline planning 
permission is another issue. 
 
 Such concerns highlight the potential role for brokers, such as the Environment Bank.  
Brokers can help to find potential offset sites and assist negotiations between developers and 
providers, supplying expertise and experience to ease the process.  This links to the concept of 
biobanks, based on conservation projects being identified in advance and under way so that a 
developer in need of an offset can simply “buy in” to a project that is already running.  This makes 
life easier for the developer than trying to find wholly new projects and offers greater flexibility 
than can be achieved simply through a scattering of one-off deals.  At the same time it allows 
larger scale and long-term projects to be used and to be supported in accordance with coherent 
strategies, with the potential for greater gains for biodiversity. 
  
 The mechanism to deliver offsets is also an issue.  Offset requirements already can be, and 
are being, created through the use of planning conditions and obligations, but there are concerns 
over the drafting and enforcement of these.  Hence the interest in conservation covenants as a 
means of providing a long-term guarantee that offset sites will be protected. 
 
 
Conservation covenants  
 
A conservation covenant is an enduring restriction on the use of land to serve a conservation 
purpose.  The crucial elements are that it runs with the land, binding successive owners, and is 
enforceable by the covenant holder even though they have no interest in nearby land.  In other 
words, it is akin to an easement “in gross”, something generally not allowed in English land law.  
Broadly similar mechanisms exist as conservation burdens in Scotland and as conservation 
easements in the USA, where there has been a huge growth in their use in recent decades, driven 
largely by the absence of strict land use regulation and significant tax breaks for land owners 
creating such easements. 
 
 The Law Commission’s consultation which closed in late June6 proposed a model based 
on creating statutory covenants in many ways similar to the conservation burdens created in 
Scotland in the last decade as part of the wholesale reform of land law.
7
  These covenants would 
be created for the purpose of conservation in the public interest, covering the cultural as well as the 
natural heritage (in practice the Scottish experience has been mainly in the context of historic 
buildings).  Only a limited number of bodies would be eligible to hold these covenants: Ministers, 
local authorities, statutory bodies and not-for-profit bodies.  Limiting the scheme in this way to 
bodies subject to degree of control and accountability avoids the need for separate detailed 
regulation of all aspects of covenants since the broader scrutiny and control mechanisms over this 
limited class of holders already provide significant safeguards.  Covenants would be created to run 
in perpetuity unless a shorter term were agreed and be registered as a local land charge.  The terms 
would be enforceable by the holder by means of an injunction, with exemplary damages in some 
cases.  Covenants would be capable of being amended or extinguished by the holder or by the land 
owner through recourse to the Lands Chamber of the Upper Tribunal. 
                                                 
5
 The aim is that local planning policies and the DEFRA guidance on measuring loss and gain will enable parties to 
work out fairly quickly and predictably what is required. 
6
 Law Commission, Conservation Covenants: A Consultation Paper (Consultation Paper No 211, 2013). 
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 Several issues have arisen in the discussions during the consultation period.  One is 
striking the balance between permanence and flexibility.  The whole point is that the covenants are 
meant to be enduring, but changing circumstances could leave them pointless or counter-
productive.  The proposal tries to balance these considerations by allowing some scope for 
termination or amendment but concern has been expressed at the proposal to allow holders to 
amend or give up a covenant without any specific scrutiny or restrictions.  This is not an issue for 
bodies whose statutory or charitable purpose means that they are dedicated to conservation, but it 
is of concern in the case of others such as Ministers and local authorities, who have many 
responsibilities, some of which may conflict with conservation, creating the temptation to give up 
a covenant when pressure for economic development grows.  The potential cost to a holder of 
contesting repeated attempts by a land owner to overturn a covenant has also been identified as a 
concern.   
 
 The enduring nature of a covenant also raises issues over drafting.  The covenant is meant 
to be a long-term restriction on the use of the land, therefore it is not appropriate to include detailed 
management prescriptions which may not be desirable in a few decades’ time.  It may therefore be 
best to make use of a double provision, with a long-term covenant setting objectives accompanied 
by a short-term management agreement with the detailed provisions specifying what is to be done 
on the ground over the next few years.  A different kind of overlapping provision has been 
prevalent in Scotland where conservation burdens for historic buildings have tended to be short-
term obligations, connected with financial support for restoration work and supported by securities 
to provide for repayment if the terms are broken (in one example there were four securities to 
protect the interests of different funding partners, as well as a burden). 
  
 Enforcement is also an issue with questions whether the current procedure for obtaining an 
injunction offers an appropriate and proportionate remedy, and whether the covenant holder 
should have rights of entry to be able to monitor the state of the land.  There is also some support 
for there being a residual body which can step in if for any reason the holder is not enforcing a 
covenant, but a distinct reluctance on the part of the likely candidates to take on this role. 
 
 In terms of covenants being used as part of an offsetting scheme, such questions raise the 
question of what covenants would add to the present position when a lot can already be done by 
planning conditions and agreements.  As well as allowing a role for bodies other than the planning 
authority, one key point is that covenants would allow for consideration to be given to offsetting 
over a much wider geographical spread and scale than can be provided for under the planning 
system.  Yet many of the issues of drafting, actually finding a suitable offset and long-term 
monitoring and enforcement would remain.  
 
 Nevertheless, covenants also have potential for wider use beyond offsetting.  There is 
some interest in the idea from the users of ecosystem services, from bodies who want to restrict the 
use of land, not for conservation, but to ensure the continuing provision of services that they 
benefit from.  For example, a water company may want to put in place a long term arrangement to 
restrict land use in order to protect its catchment area, in exchange for payments to the land-
owners affected.  This would involve a wider range both of purposes and of covenant holders, e.g. 
commercial, profit-making bodies, than the Law Commission is envisaging, but shows another 
possible means of recognising and protecting the benefits gained from nature.  Such applications 
are unlikely to be included in the current proposal for conservation covenants since it would entail 
too big a departure from more narrowly focussed model which relies on limited covenant holders 
to avoid explicit regulation on all aspects of the scheme, but may be worth returning to as part of 
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the wider interest in payment for ecosystem services as a means of giving economic value to land 
that is left in its “natural” state. 
 
Wild Law  
 
That last sentence, of course, raises a concern that is much deeper and more ethically based than 
the technical, legal questions discussed above.  Is it ever acceptable to see biodiversity as 
something that can be traded?  Especially for offsetting, accepting any such scheme views our 
shared natural heritage as a commodity that can be exchanged just like economic goods.  Even for 
those who accept the dominant world view based on capitalist economies, there are issues over the 
limits of a market approach, such as those explored in Michael Sandel’s book What Money can’t 
Buy published last year.  Much more vigorous dissent would come from those who favour a Wild 
Law perspective.  Offsetting can be seen as epitomising the wrong-headed views that separate 
humans from nature and that treat nature as simply a resource for us to handle as we wish for 
selfish human gains.  It marks the final triumph of the anthropocentric view when nature is 
reduced to a commodity to be traded like anything else, a view fundamentally at odds with the 
holistic basis of Earth Jurisprudence and the ecosystem approach.   
 
At a more pragmatic level, the implementation of offsetting may present challenges for 
conservation bodies.  On the one hand getting involved in offsetting schemes may be viewed as 
“selling out” to the development lobby, allowing the countryside to be sacrificed for economic 
gain.  On the other, the new source of funding for valuable conservation work and the opportunity 
to ensure that the “polluter is paying”, as opposed to ecological losses just being ignored, may be 




Both biodiversity offsetting and conservation covenants are very much on the agenda at present, 
but with nothing as yet set in stone.  In the coming months there will be opportunities to contribute 
to the debate on whether, and in what form, either should become part of our approach to 
conservation law.  There is a lot to think about, at every level from the technical legal issues, to the 
practicalities of their operation and the fundamental ethical acceptability of the underlying 
concepts.  The opportunities to contribute to the debate should not be missed. 
 
 
 
 
